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Introduction
The nancing of young and highly risky companies is plagued by serious problems of asymmetric information and incentives that make it dicult for these rms to obtain bank loans or outside equity. In recent years venture capital rms have developed a sophisticated set of innovative nancing instruments that can be used to mitigate these problems. In a detailed empirical study on venture capital nance in the US Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) nd that the two most common and most important instruments are the predominant use of convertible securities and the contingent allocation of control rights that are often separated from cash ow rights.
A convertible security gives the VC rm the right to convert debt (or preferred stock) into equity if the portfolio company turns out to be very successful.
This gives rise to a state contingent allocation of cash ow rights. Furthermore, venture capital contracts contain detailed provisions on the allocation of control rights. For example, even if the VC rm holds only a small fraction of the common stock of the rm, it may still have eective control over the board, sometimes directly through reserved seats, sometimes through a disproportionate share of votes.
1 Other examples include clauses that require the approval of venture investors for asset sales or large expenditures.
2 These additional rights are typically lost upon conversion. Thus, even though the cash ow rights of the VC rm increase with conversion, the venture capitalist may be left with less control rights.
In this paper we want to better understand the implications of a state contingent allocation of control rights. In particular, we oer an explanation for the stylized fact that the entrepreneur/founder of the company gets the control rights if the company is a high yer and succeeds with an IPO, while the VC is in control if the company is less successful and has to be either liquidated or sold 1 See Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) p. 287-290 . Other examples include clauses that require the approval of venture investors for asset sales or large divestures.
2 See Gompers (1999) , Table 5 .
to another company. Furthermore, we show that it may be necessary to separate cash ow and control rights.
Our model is based on two observations: First, many entrepreneurs are not only motivated by the monetary returns of their eorts but also by private benets that may accrue to them. For example, some entrepreneurs have a strong academic background and are interested in the scientic merits of their project even if these are of little commercial value. Some entrepreneurs feel a strong responsibility for the environment or their home region and may be willing to take decisions that are not optimal from a pure prot maximizing point of view.
Empirical research suggests that these benets are large compared even with the monetary rewards of entrepreneurship.
Second, the talents needed to invent a new business model and build a company from scratch are very dierent from those needed to run an established business. In the long run it can be benecial from a prot maximizing point of view to replace the founder of a company by an outside manager. It is frequently observed that entrepreneurs leave their companies after the company matured, in particular when the company has been only moderately successful or if it has been sold through a trade sale to another company.
Taken together these two stylized facts create a trade o as to who should take the decision whether to replace the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur will never own all the cash ow rights, while she enjoys all the private benets. Hence, she is unlikely to remove herself, even if it was ecient to do so. The venture capitalist, on the other hand, ignores the private benets and focuses exclusively on the monetary payo, when taking the replacement decision. Therefore, he may replace the entrepreneur, even if it was ecient to let her run the company.
If the rm is unsuccessful and the entrepreneur turns out to be unsuited to run the company, control should lie with the venture capitalist to ensure that an outside manager is hired. If the company is doing well and the entrepreneur turns out to be a suciently capable manager, the venture capitalist should relinquish control to prevent him from expropriating the entrepreneur's private benets.
Often it is impossible to directly condition the control right on the state of the world. In these cases we show that the state of the world can implicitly be made contractible by linking control rights and cash ow rights. If properly constructed, the equity portion of a convertible security will be worth more than the debt part in the good state of the world, while it will be worth less in the bad state. Even if the conversion into equity forces the venture capitalist to give up his control rights, he may be convinced to do so by the higher value of the equity claim in the good state. In the bad state he will prefer a xed claim to cash ows and thereby he keeps control. Hence, it is ecient to link cash ow and control rights such that conversion leads simultaneously to an increase in cash ow rights but to a decrease in control rights for the venture capitalist.
There are several other papers that deal with the use of convertible securities in venture capital nancing. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) and Repullo and Suarez (2004) focus exclusively on the incentive properties of the conditional allocation of cash ow rights. Berglöf (1994) considers state contingent allocation of control rights through convertible securities and argues that they allocate control to the party that has the highest outside option, when negotiating with a potential buyer. Bascha and Walz (2001) argue that state contingent control rights are a way to implement the rst best decision regarding IPO's.
Focusing on cash ow rights only, Schmidt (2003) shows with a related argument that convertible debt can implement ecient eort investment, if both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are important for the success of the project. Hellmann (1998) argues that it may be optimal for the entrepreneur to relinquish control to the venture capitalist to raise the funds necessary to start the venture. No argument is advanced, however, why this control right is tied to cash ow rights in the form of a convertible security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3 shows that simple debt or equity contracts will in general not implement the rst best, while we demonstrate in section 4 that a contingent control structure does. Section 5 the possibility of renegotiation. Section 6 concludes and shows that our conditional control structures can be interpreted as a convertible security combined with a control structure that is contingent on whether the venture capitalist exercises his conversion option.
The Model
Consider an entrepreneur (E) with an idea for a protable project but no means to nance it. The project requires an initial investment I that can be provided by a venture capitalist (V). Both parties are risk neutral. At date 0, E proposes a contract to V that governs their relationship. If V accepts the contract, they invest I. If V rejects the contract, he gets a utility that is normalized to zero.
At date 1, a state of the world denoted by θ ∈ {θ l , θ h } is realized. With probability q the state is θ At date 3 the entrepreneur can be replaced by an outside manager. We assume that the probability of success is always higher with an outside manager than with the entrepreneur, i.e. p R > p E . The reason is that the entrepreneur of a young start-up company is typically not a professional manager. She came up with the idea for the project and she built up the company but she need not be best suited for running the company when it matures. Thus, expected monetary returns are always higher if r = 1. 
and
i. Assumption 2 If both parties behave eciently the expected monetary return of the project is sucient to cover the investment cost,
i.e.
Furthermore
We can now be more specic about the feasible contracts that can be used to govern the project. The state of the world θ and the private benet b are observable by both parties but not veriable to the courts and cannot be contracted upon. However, the parties can allocate control and cash ow rights. Let C ∈ {E, V } denote who can decide whether or not to replace E at date 3, and let v(m) denote the amount of money V gets at date 4 as a function of the monetary return of the project. V is only interested in his monetary payo, so his utility function is given by
E's monetary payo is e(m) = m − v(m). However, she also cares about her privat benets, so her utility function is given by
We will rst look at unconditional control structures that x (C, v(m)) at date 0 for the entire relationship. However, the parties may also agree on a conditional control structures such as an option contract. For example, V could be given the option to choose at some point in time between dates 2 and 3 between control structure (C 1 , v 1 (m)) and control structure (C 2 , v 2 (m)). We will show that such a conditional control structure can be used to implement the rst best in our model. Therefore, we do not look at more complicated contracts. We will also
show that the conditional control structures that we consider closely resemble a combination of a convertible security and an allocation of control rights that is contingent on whether the venture capitalist exercises his conversion rights.
Debt and Equity
Let us rst consider some standard unconditional control structures in order to show that they cannot be used to implement the ecient allocation.
Suppose that the parties nance the project with equity, i.e. v(m) = αm and e(m) = (1 − α)m. Note that because of E's wealth constraint and because V has to break even we must have 0 < α ≤ 1. The following proposition shows that no matter whether E is in control (C = E) or V is in control (C = V ), the outcome is always inecient.
Proposition 1 Any unconditional equity contract with v(m) = αm, 0 < α ≤ 1 yields an inecient allocation:
• If the venture capitalist gets the control right (C = V ) he chooses to replace the entrepreneur (r = 1) not only in state θ l but also in state θ h . Thus, V replaces E too often because he does not take into account E's private benets of control.
• If the entrepreneur gets the control right (C = E) she chooses
Furthermore, there exists an α < 1 such that for all α > α she chooses r = 0 and b > b * (θ
Thus, E consumes to many private benets if she is in control.
Proof:
Thus, for all α > 0 and all states θ ∈ {θ h , θ l } V will replace E, which is inecient in state θ h .
Suppose now that C = E and consider state θ h . If E wants to choose r = 0 at date 3 she will choose b(α) = arg max{p
The last inequality follows from Assumption 1. Thus, in state θ h E will not remove herself (which is ecient). However, she will consume too many private benets.
Consider now state θ l . If E removes herself at date 3, she should choose b = 0 which yields an expected payo of p R (1 − α)m(0, θ l ). Note that this payo goes to 0 as α goes to 1. If E is anticipates that she is not going to remove herself, she should choose b(α) = arg max{p
is decreasing in α but bounded below byb because E can always guarantee herself at leastb by choosing b =b. Thus, there exists an α < 1 such that for all α > α it must be optimal for E to choose r = 0 and b(α) > b * (θ l ), both of which is inecient.
Q.E.D.
The problem of equity with V control is that V has an incentive to replace E in both states of the world, because he does not take into account E's private benets. Equity with E control is also inecient: In state θ h E will choose b < b * (θ h ) because she enjoys the full private benets but has to pay only fraction
(1 − α) of the cost. Furthermore, in state θ l , E may have an incentive to stay in the rm because of the private benets she enjoys, even though it would be more ecient if she left.
Next we consider a debt contract. A debt contract requires E to make a xed payment D to V at date 4. Note that in our model a debt contract is an unconditional control structure. The debt payment is due at date 4 when the returns of the rm accrue. Thus, even if the rm goes bankrupt at date 4, all decisions that our model focusses on have been taken already.
For simplicity we will restrict attention to the case where E can repay her debt if the rm was successful at date 4. Clearly, if the debt cannot be repaid in case of success, it would be even more dicult to achieve an ecient allocation with a debt contract. • If the venture capitalist gets the control right (C = V ) he chooses to replace the entrepreneur (r = 1) not only in state θ l but also in state θ h in order to maximize the probability that the debt is repaid. Thus, V replaces E too often.
which is ecient. However, in state θ l she will not choose to remove herself if 
. If she is replaced by an outside manager her payo
, so she should choose b = 0. She prefers the former strategy to the latter i
which is equivalent to
The problem with a debt contract that gives control to V is that V will always replace E in order to maximize the probability that the debt is repaid.
If, on the other hand, control is given to E, then E may be unwilling to remove herself but rather stay in charge and consume her private benets. Part of the cost from doing so is born by V who receives his debt payment with a smaller probability if E stays in the rm.
Corollary 1 The ecient allocation cannot be implemented by any combination of debt and equity.
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1. Since any α > 0 induces inecient behavior in at least one state of the world, so does any combination of equity and debt.
Contingent Control Structures
In this section we will show that a conditional control structure can be used to implement the rst best ecient allocation even if debt or equity cannot.
Proposition 3 Consider a convertible security {(D, V ), (α, E)} which gives V the right to choose at date 2.5 between a debt claim D with V control and an equity claim α with E control. If D and α are chosen such that
then the convertible security induces E and V to behave eciently in both states of the world.
Proof: We rst analyze the contractual choice of V at date 2.5 for any given b.
Consider rst state θ l . If V chooses debt with V control, he will replace E at date 3 and his expected payo is
If he chooses equity and E control, then E will choose r = 1 if and only if p
If α is below this threshold, her prot share is suciently high that she will voluntary remove herself. In this case, V's expected payo is p R αm(b, θ l ). If however, α is above the threshold, E's prot share is so small that she would rather not replace herself but consume b. In this case, V's expected payo is
Thus, V will always choose debt with V control if
which holds by Assumption 2.
Consider now state θ h . We rst show that in equilibrium V will choose (α, E)
if and only if b ≤ b * . Note rst that if V chooses (D, V ), he will always replace E at date 3 in order to increase the probability that the debt is repaid. anticipates that V will always go for debt with V control and that he will replace her at date 3. Therefore, it is optimal for her to choose b = 0.
Consider now state θ
h . E anticipates that V will choose equity and E control if and only if b ≤ b * (θ h ) in which case she will stay on in the company and can consume her private benets.
If she chooses b > b * (θ h ), V will choose (D, V ) and replace her at date 3.
Thus her expected payo in this case is
which is strictly decreasing in b. Because of the constraint b > b
over an open set and there is no optimal value for b. However, the payo that can be obtained with b > b
On the other hand, if she chooses b ≤ b * (θ h ) V will opt for (α, E) and E will not be replaced. In this case her expected payo is
In this case she would like to choose b
Thus, E will choose b = b * (θ h ) if and only if
this is equivalent to
which holds by Assumption 1.
Thus, we have shown that in the good state V will choose (α, E) if and only
It remains to be shown that α < 1. Note that Assumption 2 implies that
Finally, we have to show that V recovers his investment cost I. In the bad state he gets p R D. In the good state he gets p E αm(b
so he just breaks even.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. At date 2.5 V has to decide whether to take a debt claim and have control at date 3 or whether to have an equity claim and give control to E. In the bad state, the equity claim is worth little and V prefers to replace E in order to get the xed payment D with a higher 
his overall expected payo is given by
Thus, any ecient project that satises Assumptions 1 and 2 can be nanced by using a contingent control structure. Therefore, E could to increase α in order to induce V to behave eciently. We have to distinguish two cases.
• D ≤ m(b, θ h ): In this case V can secure himself p R D, the same as on the equilibrium path, by sticking to (D, V ). Because the total surplus is reduced by deviating from b * that leaves less for E than on the equilibrium path. Therefore, it does not pay o for E do deviate.
• D > m(b, θ h ): In this case E the company would have to declare bankruptcy and the whole monetary payo goes to V. Therefore, even oering α = 1
will not induce V to relinquish control because he gets m(b, θ h ) with the higher probability p R if he keeps his control right..
Conclusion
The contingent control structure that we used in Section 4 can be interpreted as a convertible security combined with a shift in control rights if the conversion option is exercised. For example, in the initial contract the venture capitalist could be given convertible debt or convertible preferred stock and in addition control rights over the company including the right to replace the entrepreneur.
However, these control rights are lost if the venture capitalist chooses to convert his debt claim into equity. In this case, the entrepreneur receives full control.
The venture capitalist will exercise his conversion option only if the rm is highly successful. Furthermore, the entrepreneur wants him to exercise his conversion option in order to receive the control over the company. Therefore, she is willing to consume not to many private benets in order not to reduce the monetary value of the rm too much.
On the other hand, if the bad state of the world materializes, it it is not protable for V to exercise his option. Therefore he will remain in control and replace E, which is ecient.
It interesting to note that cash ow rights and control rights move in opposite directions here. If V does not exercise his conversion option, he holds a debt claim, but he is assigned the control right to remove E. If V exercises his option, he holds equity. Nevertheless, the control rights are now passed to E. This is just the opposite of standard debt and equity. With standard debt, the debt holder has no control rights as long as the debtor is not in default, while the traditional equity holders have all the residual rights of control in a company.
Such a separation of cash ow rights and control rights is often observed in venture capital nance.
